This paper examines the nexus between war and diplomacy from a historical perspective. The Igbo people of Nigeria are one of its three dominant ethnic groups. The 1959 National Council of Nigeria and Cameroon (NCNC) and Northern People’s Congress (NPC) alliance placed the Igbos on a secured ground in Nigeria. It made Nnamdi Azikiwe the first indigenous President of Nigeria and gave Igbos good representation in Nigeria’s public and civil service until the fall of the First Republic in 1966. Thus, this paper problematized the post-1966 socio-political misfortunes of the Igbos in Nigeria as the main catalyst for the creation of the Biafran army. Using historical research methodology, the paper corroborates primary and secondary materials (online sources) to demonstrate that the establishment of the Biafran army in Igboland was a secessionist alternative to diplomacy between 1967 and 1970. It finds that the Igbos’ perceived threat to the security of their lives was epistemologically responded to through Igbo hermeneutics of the nexus between war and diplomacy. The ephemeral military confrontation that ensued between the fledgling state of Biafra and Nigeria was a continuation of diplomacy by other means. And the collapse of the Aburi Accord which Nigeria signed with the separatist Eastern region, was the diplomatic breakdown that triggered the outbreak of the Biafra war as a diplomatic last resort for salvaging Igbo acrimony. Therefore, this paper concludes that the institution of the Biafran army in the struggle for Biafra perfectly underscored Igbo epistemology of the nexus between war and diplomacy.